Genesis Bio Pharm v. Chiron Corp by unknown
2002 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-10-2002 
Genesis Bio Pharm v. Chiron Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002 
Recommended Citation 
"Genesis Bio Pharm v. Chiron Corp" (2002). 2002 Decisions. 9. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/9 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2002 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           ___________ 
 
                     Nos.  00-2893 & 00-2981 
                           ___________ 
 
               GENESIS BIO-PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., 
                                                                              
Appellant in No. 00-2893 
                                 
                               v. 
                                 
         CHIRON CORPORATION; BEHRINGWERKE A.G.; CHIRON 
    BEHRINGWERKE GMBH & CO.; BIOLOGICAL AND POPULAR CULTURE, 
         INC.; CHIRON BEHRING GMBH & CO.; HOECHST A.G. 
                                 
                          ___________ 
                                 
               GENESIS BIO-PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. 
                                 
                               v. 
                                 
         CHIRON CORPORATION; BEHRINGWERKE A.G.; CHIRON 
    BEHRINGWERKE GMBH & CO.; BIOLOGICAL AND POPULAR CULTURE, 
         INC.; CHIRON BEHRING GMBH & CO.; HOECHST A.G. 
                                 
         CHIRON CORPORATION; CHIRON BEHRING GMBH & CO., 
                   Appellants in No. 00-2981  
                           ___________ 
 
         On Appeal from the United States District Court 
                  for the District of New Jersey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     District Court Judge:  The Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
                    (D.C. Civil No. 98-02445) 
                           ___________ 
 
                    Argued November 26, 2001 
 
 
         Before:  ROTH, FUENTES and WEIS, Circuit Judges. 
 
                    (Filed: January 10, 2002) 
 
W. Michael Garner, Esq. (Argued) 
Cheryl A. Stanton, Esq. 
Dady & Garner 
80 South Eighth Street 
4000 IDS Center 
Minneapolis, MN 55402 
Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
Genesis Bio-Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
 
Robert C. Epstein, Esq. (Argued) 
Jacqueline Greenberg, Esq. 
Porzio, Bromberg & Newman 
100 Southgate Parkway 
Morristown, NJ 07962 
Counsel for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 
Chiron Corporation and Chiron Behring GMBH & Co. 
 
 
                     ________________________ 
 
                        MEMORANDUM OPINION 
                     ________________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
     In this matter, plaintiff Genesis Bio-Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
("Genesis"), a New 
Jersey-based distributor of pharmaceutical products alleges that 
defendants Chiron 
Corporation ("Chiron"), a California company and Chiron Behring, a German 
company, 
breached an oral agreement for the distribution of a rabies vaccine in the 
United States. 
Genesis claims that the oral agreement was made between itself and Hoechst 
A.G 
("Hoechst"), at a meeting in Frankfurt, Germany and that, at the time the 
agreement was 
made, Chiron, a joint venturer with Chiron Behring,  had authorized  
Hoechst to act in its 
behalf.  
     Following a series of motions, the District Court, among other 
decisions: (1) 
dismissed the complaint against Hoechst for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
(2) denied 
Chiron Behring's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and, 
(3) dismissed 
the complaint against Chiron and Chiron Behring, holding that the Parol 
Evidence Rule 
barred Genesis' claims. The parties cross-appeal.  Discerning no error, we 
will affirm the 
rulings of the District Court.  
                               I. 
     The relevant facts are as follows. Hoechst, a German health care 
company, is the 
manufacturer of RabAvert, a rabies vaccine. Sometime between 1989 and 
1990, Genesis 
began to perform marketing consulting work for Hoechst, for the purpose of 
becoming 
the exclusive U.S. distributor of RabAvert. 
     In February, 1996, Hoechst entered into a joint venture agreement 
with Chiron. As 
part of this agreement, Hoechst  transferred its entire vaccine business, 
including the 
right to produce and distribute RabAvert, to "Chiron Behring," the joint 
venture entity. 
Chiron Behring was incorporated and located in Germany.  The joint venture 
agreement 
gave Chiron ultimate decision-making power with regard to all business 
decisions 
concerning the distribution of RabAvert.  Shortly thereafter, Hoechst 
informed Genesis 
that Chiron was taking over the distribution of RabAvert in the U.S. At 
this time, Genesis 
began to demand compensation for its consulting services.  
     On April 30, 1996, Genesis' president Jerrold Grossman met with 
representatives 
from Chiron to discuss a potential distributor relationship. No agreement 
was reached at 
this meeting.  
     On June 27, 1996, Grossman and Genesis' attorney met with Hoechst 
executives 
and attorneys in Frankfurt, Germany and reached a settlement agreement 
(the "Settlement 
Agreement"). The parties agreed that, among other things; 
         a)   Hoechst would pay $380,000 to Genesis to release Hoechst 
from 
         "any and all claims which Genesis has... relating in any way to 
any 
         and all relationships between the Parties [to the Settlement 
         Agreement], for all time in which the Parties have had a 
         relationship."  
         b)   Hoechst would use "reasonable and diligent efforts...to 
assist 
         Genesis in 'negotiating and concluding' an agreement with Chiron 
         and the Joint Venture [Chiron Behring] for the distribution by 
         Genesis of ...RabAvert, in the U.S. on terms that are outlined in 
the 
         annexed memoranda from Chiron to [Hoechst]...(with the 
         understanding that Chiron has strategic leadership of the joint 
         venture [Chiron Behring])," and that, 
         c)   "[t]his Agreement contains the entire agreement of the 
parties with 
         respect to the subject matter hereof, and all prior 
understandings, 
         discussions and representations are hereby merged herein." (the 
         "complete integration clause"). 
          
     Genesis maintains that it was induced to enter into the Settlement 
Agreement by 
Hoechst's representation that it had authority to negotiate on behalf of 
Chiron. In its 
complaint, Genesis alleges that the Hoechst representatives began the 
meeting by 
projecting onto a screen, two memos that Chiron sent Hoechst, proposing to 
grant 
Genesis certain distribution rights to RabAvert and other vaccines.  
     The first memo, dated May 30, 1996, stated that Chiron "would be 
prepared 
to...sell Genesis all Chiron vaccines, including rabies vaccine, at a 
price equal to the 
'best' distributor price...for a 5 year period," and "[w]ork with Genesis 
to 'bid' on 
contracts for rabies vaccines."  
     The second memo, dated June 21, 1996, stated that "Chiron has offered 
to sell 
Genesis...the complete line of Chiron vaccines at the best price offered 
to vaccine 
distributors in the U.S. In addition, we would work with Genesis on "bid 
requests"...with 
Genesis receiving a price...equal to the best price given to any other 
vaccine 
distributor...for that bid."    
     Soon after the Settlement Agreement meeting, Grossman traveled to 
California 
ostensibly, to close the deal, and to discuss a distributorship with 
Chiron. Grossman met 
only briefly with Chiron's president, who avoided all discussion of a 
distribution 
agreement. According to Grossman, Chiron refused to meet again with 
Grossman, 
refused to respond to Grossman's request for confirmation of an agreement 
with it, and 
claimed that Hoechst had "no authority to speak or negotiate on behalf of 
Chiron or 
represent Chiron in any way."  
     On March 9, 1998, Genesis filed suit in the Superior Court of New 
Jersey against 
Chiron, Hoechst, Chiron Behring, and Bio-Pop. Specifically, the suit 
sought to enforce 
the alleged Distribution Agreement, or alternatively to recover damages 
for, among other 
things, breach of contract, fraud, civil conspiracy and tortious 
interference. On May 22, 
1998, Chiron removed the case to federal district court in New Jersey. 
Thereafter, 
Hoechst moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
and for failure 
to state a claim, contending that the Parol Evidence Rule barred Genesis' 
claims. Chiron 
Behring moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Chiron and 
Chiron Behring also joined in Hoechst's motion to dismiss based on the 
Parol Evidence 
Rule and filed a separate motion to dismiss on the additional grounds of 
judicial estoppel 
and absence of an indispensable party.   
     The District Court first disposed of Genesis' claims against Hoechst 
by granting 
Hoechst's  motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting 
that "Hoechst is a 
German company, and the settlement agreement was negotiated and executed 
in 
Germany, and no allegation evidence demonstrated that Hoechst ever entered 
New Jersey 
or directed activities there."   
     After further briefing and oral argument, the District Court denied 
Chiron 
Behring's jurisdictional motion, determining that Chiron Behring's "focal 
role as the 
manufacturer of the vaccine" in question, and their close corporate 
relation with Chiron 
allowed the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Chiron Behring. 
However, the 
court dismissed the complaint against both Chiron and the Chiron Behring, 
holding that 
the Parol Evidence Rule excluded any evidence that Chiron and/or Chiron 
Behring had 
authorized Hoechst to negotiate an exclusive distribution agreement with 
Genesis on 
their behalf.  The Court also denied Chiron and Chiron Behring's motion to 
dismiss on 
grounds of judicial estoppel, and on the absence of an indispensable party 
claim.  
     Genesis appeals the District Court's dismissal of its claims under 
the Parol 
Evidence Rule. Chiron and Chiron Behring appeal the District Court's 
denial of their 
motion to dismiss against Chiron Behring for lack of personal jurisdiction 
decision and 
the denial of their judicial estoppel and indispensable party motions.  
                              II. 
                              A.  
     We must first consider the District Court's denial of Chiron 
Behring's motion to 
dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. We review a District 
Court's decisions 
regarding personal jurisdiction de novo. See, Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. 
v. Consolidated 
Fiber Glass Products Co. 75 F.3d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that 
"whether 
personal jurisdiction may be exercised over an out-of-state defendant is a 
question of 
law, and this court's review is therefore plenary.").  
     New Jersey's long-arm statute, N. J. Court Rule 4:4-4,  has been 
interpreted as 
extending jurisdiction over non-residents "to the uttermost limits 
permitted by the U.S. 
Constitution." Charles Gendler Co. v. Telecom Equity Co. 102 N.J. 460, 469 
(1980). 
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, personal 
jurisdiction 
depends upon "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation." 
Shaffer v. Heitner 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). 
     Here, we find that Chiron Behring is subject to New Jersey personal 
jurisdiction 
because of the nature of its corporate  relationship with Chiron 
Corporation. New Jersey 
courts have determined that a parent corporation's contacts with the forum 
state may 
justify exercise of personal jurisdiction over its (wholly-owned) non-
resident subsidiary. 
See, Moon Carrier v. Reliance Insurance, 379 A.2d 517 (N.J. Super. 1977). 
The relevant 
jurisdictional inquiry is "whether the [subsidiary] and the parent...so 
operate as single 
entity, or unified and cohesive economic unit, that when the parent is 
within venue of 
court, the [subsidiary] is also within court's jurisdiction; [this] 
'single entity' test requires 
that a parent over which the court has jurisdiction so control and 
dominate a subsidiary as 
in effect to disregard the latter's independent corporate existence." Moon 
Carrier v. 
Reliance Insurance, 379 A.2d 517 (N.J. Super. 1977). This court has also 
used the single 
entity test. See, e.g., Lucas v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 666 F.2d 
800 (Cir. 3, 
1981).  
     Chiron is a multi-national health care company that does business 
within the State 
of New Jersey. On the basis of these extensive contacts with the state, 
Chiron has waived 
any claims it might have with regards to personal jurisdiction.  As the 
attorney for both 
Chiron and Chiron Behring admitted at oral argument, Chiron Behring is a 
wholly- 
owned subsidiary of Chiron Corporation. There is ample evidence in the 
record that 
Chiron dominates Chiron Behring and that the two are acting as a single 
entity, at least in 
this matter. For instance, Chiron has ultimate decision making power with 
regard to all 
business decisions concerning Chiron Behring (including the distribution 
of RabAvert). 
Additionally, both share the same legal counsel in this litigation. 
Therefore, because of  
the nature of the relationship between the parent corporation, Chiron, and 
its wholly- 
owned subsidiary, Chiron Behring, attributional jurisdiction attaches, and 
the New Jersey 
District Court acted properly in exercising personal jurisdiction over 
Chiron Behring. 
See,  Lucas v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 666 F.2d 800 (Cir. 3, 
1981) (indicating 
factors that may have a bearing on attributing the jurisdiction of a 
subsidiary to a parent 
corporation); Kuehne & Nagel v. Geosource, Inc., 874 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 
1989) (same).    
                               B. 
     We next consider the District Court's determination that Genesis 
failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted under FRCP 12(b)(6). The district 
judge 
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the parol evidence 
rule barred 
Genesis' evidence of a completed distribution agreement.  For the reasons 
stated below, 
we agree with the district judge and will affirm her ruling.  
      
     Genesis alleges that there were two aspects to their Settlement 
Agreement with 
Hoechst. The first, clearly documented in the Agreement, was Hoechst's 
$380,000 
payment to Genesis for its past efforts. The second was an alleged 
distribution agreement 
with Chiron and Chiron Behring. Genesis claims that Chiron and Chiron 
Behring had 
[verbally] authorized Hoechst to negotiate at the Frankfurt meeting on 
their behalf, and 
that they left that meeting with the essential terms of a distribution 
agreement hammered 
out. We agree with the district judge that the parol evidence rule 
prohibits our 
consideration of this evidence . See, Genesis Bio-Pharmaceuticals v. 
Chiron Corp. D.C. 
Civil No. 98-2445 (D.N.J. 2000) (determining that if such evidence were 
allowed into 
the record, it would allow for the contradiction of the written settlement 
agreement by 
"the story of the negotiation" of [the] written contract "as told by the 
litigant" (quoting 
Advanced Medical, Inc. v. Arden Medical Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 188, 195 (3d 
Cir. 1992))).  
     The parol evidence rule provides that any previous oral 
representations or 
agreements, offered to "vary, modify, or supersede the written contract, 
[are] 
inadmissible in evidence." Fr. Winkler KG v. Stoller, 839 F.2d 1002 (3d 
Cir. 1988); See 
also, Compton Press, Inc. Employees' Profit Sharing Retirement Plan v. 
Granada 
Investments, Inc., 1992 WL 566329 (D.N.J.,1992). (instructing that "the 
parole evidence 
rule bars, as a matter of substantive contract law, any attempt to offer 
oral evidence to 
vary the terms of a fully integrated written contract").  
     The Settlement Agreement in this matter is clearly fully integrated. 
See, 
Appellant's Appendix, at A52 (stating that "this Agreement contains the 
entire agreement 
of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, an all prior 
understanding, 
discussions and representations are hereby merged within."). Furthermore, 
the plain 
language of the Settlement Agreement requires that Hoechst use "reasonable 
and diligent 
efforts...to assist Genesis in negotiating and concluding an agreement 
with [Chiron and 
Chiron Behring] for the distribution by Genesis of Chiron vaccine 
products." Later in the 
same paragraph there is a disclaimer that Hoechst's promise to assist 
Genesis is made 
"with the understanding that Chiron has strategic leadership of the joint 
venture." 
     If Hoechst had truly been "authorized" to negotiate a distribution 
agreement on 
behalf of the others, as Genesis contends, then the language in the 
Settlement Agreement 
modifying Hoechst's promise "with the understanding that Chiron has 
strategic 
leadership of the joint venture" becomes meaningless. Furthermore, if the 
result of the 
Frankfurt meeting was "a distribution agreement going forward" between 
Genesis, 
Chiron and Chiron Behring, then the language in the Settlement Agreement 
that Hoechst  
would subsequently further "assist" Genesis in "negotiating (and 
concluding)" a 
distribution agreement with those same parties is superfluous.  
     The only written evidence that Genesis offers in support of its 
allegation that it 
had negotiated a binding distribution agreement with Chiron are the two 
memos from 
Chiron to Hoechst.  However, these documents make no specific mention of 
any 
authorization by Chiron and Chiron Behring for Hoechst to conclude a 
multi-million 
dollar distribution agreement in their absence. Even when viewing these 
memos in the 
light most favorable to Genesis, they require us to draw inferences that 
are contradicted 
by the plain language of the Settlement Agreement. We have previously 
determined that 
this court is not obliged to accept as true, even at this preliminary 
stage, such 
"unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences." See, City of 
Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d 
at 263 (3d Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the District 
Court dismissing 
this matter for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
In light of this 
determination, we need not reach Chiron and Chiron Behring's motions to 
dismiss the 
complaint based on the judicial estoppel doctrine or the absence of an 
indispensable 
party.  
                                 
                                 
                             III.  
     For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the ruling of the District 
Court denying 
Chiron Behring's motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. 
However, we 
grant Chiron and Chiron Behring's motion to dismiss based on the Parol 
Evidence Rule.  
 
 
 
  
 
_____________________________ 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
 
Kindly file the foregoing Opinion. 
 
 
 
 
                                         /s/ Julio M. Fuentes 
                                                                             
Circuit Judge 
